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Barbara Boynton does not fall into a category of individuals to whom 
ConocoPhillips owed a duty.  In fact, Mrs. Boynton had no relationship whatsoever with 
ConocoPhillips.  Mrs. Boynton’s husband, the Plaintiff in this action, worked for a 
contractor hired by ConocoPhillips.  During the time that Mr. Boynton was an invitee on 
ConocoPhillips’s land, ConocoPhillips employees worked with asbestos products in his 
general vicinity.  The dust from these products allegedly landed on Mr. Boynton’s clothes 
and he carried it home.  His wife then washed his clothes and was exposed to the dust.  
Years later, she contracted mesothelioma.  
 This Court’s analysis in Jeffs explains how Utah courts should determine whether 
one individual is owed a duty by another.  B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 5, 275 
P.3d 228.  If, as in this case, there is no special relationship between the alleged victim and 
defendant, then the plaintiff must show that the defendant took an affirmative act that 
created a duty.  In other words, defendant must have acted with misfeasance toward the 
alleged victim.  If there is no misfeasance toward the alleged victim, if there is only non-
feasance, no duty attaches. 
 Plaintiff’s contention that ConocoPhillips’s employees’ work with asbestos 
products while Mr. Boynton was on ConocoPhillips’s facility was an affirmative act toward 
Mrs. Boynton conflicts with the Court’s decision in Graves.  This Court explained that the 
defendant’s actions must be more than “plausibly connected” to the harm to be an 
affirmative act.   Graves v. N. E. Serv., Inc., 2015 UT 28, ¶ 26, 345 P.3d 619.  






the broader duty to undertake additional measures aimed at preventing [the harm].”   Id. ¶ 
29 (emphasis in original).  ConocoPhillips’s employees’ work with asbestos products while 
Mr. Boynton was on the ConocoPhillips facility was only plausibly connected to the harm.  
Plaintiff’s real complaint is that ConocoPhillips’s failed to prevent asbestos dust from 
leaving its premises.  ConocoPhillips, therefore, engaged in no affirmative acts as to Mrs. 
Boynton and owed her no duty.   
 Finally, even if there were a duty in this case, the three “minus factors” identified in 
Jeffs would eliminate any such duty.  First, if, as Plaintiff now claims, the OSHA standards 
made it foreseeable that Mr. Boynton would be carrying asbestos home to his wife, then it 
was just as foreseeable that ConocoPhillips could have relied upon his employer to make 
sure Mr. Boynton did not do so.  Second, considering the Court’s focus on broad categories, 
were the Court to say that landowners had a duty to those with whom its invitees came in 
contact, that would greatly increase the duties of all landowners. Finally, no other general 







STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
 
Issue: Did the district court correctly hold that a premises owner, ConocoPhillips, owed no 
duty to take additional actions to prevent a person who never entered the premises, Mrs. 
Boynton, from being exposed to dust generated on its property and carried to her by an 
invitee to the property?   
 
Standard of Review: Whether a legal duty exists is a pure question of law.  Jeffs, 2012 
UT 11, ¶ 5.  A lower court’s legal conclusions that result in the entry or denial of summary 
judgment are reviewed for correctness. Herland v. Izatt, 2015 UT 30, ¶ 9, 345 P.3d 661. 
 
Preservation: ConocoPhillips preserved this issue for appeal by filing a motion for 
summary judgment seeking a ruling that ConocoPhillips does not owe a duty of care to 
Mrs. Boynton. (R. 2235–2246.)  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. RELEVANT FACTS 
 Mr. Boynton married Mrs. Boynton in September 1962.  (R. 01236.)  After their 
marriage, Mr. Boynton worked as a laborer at Kennecott Utah Copper, LLC’s 
(“Kennecott”) smelter and continued in that position for about a year (from 1962 to late 
1963 or early 1964).  (R. 04165.)  Mr. Boynton claims he was exposed to asbestos dust as 
a laborer by working in the vicinity of workers who removed and installed pipe insulation 






66.)  He then worked as an apprentice and journeyman electrician for Wasatch Electric at 
Kennecott’s smelter from 1964 to 1966.  (R. 04165, 04242, 05959.)  In that capacity, he 
was responsible for “[r]unning pipe, conduit, pulling wire, terminating, [and] heat trace” 
on “newer construction and remodel, upgrades…plant-wide, around the converter aisle and 
places like that.”  (R. 04197, 04242, 05241.)  He believes he was exposed to asbestos from 
the installation of the insulation on pipes and dry asbestos mix that was used by pipe fitters 
who worked within 20 feet of him. (R. 04166.)   
 Mr. Boynton was employed as an electrician for L.E. Myers Electric and worked at 
the ConocoPhillips refinery off and on from 1976–78.  (R. 02237.)  Before that, he also 
worked as an electrician for Jelco Electric and worked at PacificCorp’s Huntington Plant 
for 5 to 6 months in 1973.  His duties at L.E. Myers Electric and Jelco Electric involved 
“running conduit, pulling wire, cable tray, [and] heat tracing pipes.” (R. 02685–86, 02393.)  
Mr. Boynton alleges that he was exposed to asbestos dust on both of these premises while 
working within 20 feet of insulators who were sawing and installing pipe, boilers, and 
turbine insulation. (R. 02686.)  He also alleges that the insulators removed the old 
insulation and let it fall to the ground close to where he was working.  (R. 02256–57.) 
 Mrs. Boynton did not visit ConocoPhillips’s premises and had no relationship with 
ConocoPhillips.  (R.  02238, 04090.) 
 Mr. Boynton alleges that Mrs. Boynton died from mesothelioma that she contracted 
from laundering his work clothing.  (R. 01235–37, 02366.)  Mr. Boynton brought strict 






against the Premises Defendants are identical and include a list of things that Plaintiff 
claims Premises Defendants failed to do. (R. 01238–57.) 
 After Premises Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that there was no 
duty in this case of omissions, Mr. Boynton pointed to paragraph 13 of the Amended 
Complaint. 
Mrs. Boynton was exposed to asbestos through her husband’s 
work with and around asbestos-containing products while 
working at locations including, but not limited to the 
following: [listing Kennecott, PacifiCorp, and ConocoPhillips 
locations].  The activities of cutting, chipping, mixing, sanding, 
sawing, scraping and sweeping that occurred in association 
with the work performed by Mr. Boynton and other workers 
working around Mr. Boynton with asbestos-containing 
products exposed him to great quantities of asbestos.  These 
asbestos exposures continued as asbestos-containing dust 
accumulated on his work clothes and was transported to his 
cars and home exposing his wife, Barbara Boynton, to great 
quantities of asbestos as she too came in contact with the 
asbestos-containing products carried home on those clothes 
and deposited into her home and cars.  
 
(R. 04419.)  But Mr. Boynton does not allege that Mrs. Boynton was harmed by “cutting, 
chipping, mixing, sanding, sawing, scraping and sweeping.”  That would be impossible 
as she never entered the premises.  
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
 Mr. Boynton filed his Amended Complaint on March 23, 2018.  (R. 01258.)  
ConocoPhillips moved for summary judgment on October 22, 2018; PacifiCorp moved for 
summary judgment on October 26, 2018; and Kennecott moved for summary judgment on 
November 21, 2018.  (R. 02246, 03380, 04180.)  On January 25, 2019, the district court 






an order denying Kennecott’s motion for summary judgment and granting ConocoPhillips 
and PacifiCorp’s motions for summary judgment.  (R. 05447.)  In granting 
ConocoPhillips’s and PacifiCorp’s motions for summary judgment, the district court 
determined that neither defendant had engaged in any affirmative acts as to Mrs. Boynton 
that would give rise to a duty.  The court also held that, even if ConocoPhillips and 
PacifiCorp had engaged in affirmative acts, each of the Jeffs “minus” factors weighed in 
favor of finding no duty.  (R. 05443–47.) 
 Kennecott appealed the district court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment.  
Plaintiff responded and cross-appealed the lower court’s entry of summary judgment in 
favor of ConocoPhillips and PacifiCorp.  ConocoPhillips asks this Court to affirm the lower 
court’s entry of summary judgment in its favor on the basis that ConocoPhillips owed no 
duty to Mrs. Boynton. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court correctly concluded that ConocoPhillips owed no duty of care to 
Mrs. Boynton.  First, ConocoPhillips did not engage any affirmative acts as to Mrs. 
Boynton.  Rather, Plaintiff’s complaint is that ConocoPhillips failed to prevent Mr. 
Boynton—an employee of an independent contractor working on its premises, i.e. an 
invitee—from carrying dust home and exposing Mrs. Boynton.  Mrs. Boynton never 
entered ConocoPhillips’s premises and was never employed by ConocoPhillips. Because 
ConocoPhillips engaged in no affirmative acts as to Mrs. Boynton, no duty can attach.  
Second, and as Plaintiff concedes, there is no special relationship between Mrs. Boynton 






consider the remaining “minus” factors, those factors would eliminate a duty even if one 
existed.  Harm resulting from a substance taken off the premises by an invitee is not 
foreseeable because premises owners do not control their invitees’—including independent 
contractors and their employees—independent conduct.  For the same reason, 
ConocoPhillips was not in the best position to take precautions to prevent the harm.  
Furthermore, imposing a duty on premises owners to prevent invitees from taking 
substances off their property and harming others would impose nearly limitless liability. 
All the Jeffs duty factors weigh against finding that ConocoPhillips owed a duty to 
Mrs. Boynton.  The Court should, therefore, affirm the lower court’s entry of summary 
judgment in ConocoPhillips’s favor.  
ARGUMENT 
 Duty, one of the four essential elements of negligence, is the legal obligation to 
conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another.  See, e.g., B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. 
West, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 5, 275 P.3d 228.  Duty is a question of law that must be determined 
on a “categorical basis for a given class of tort claims” and “should be articulated in 
relatively clear, categorical, bright-line rules of law applicable to a general class of cases.”  
Id. ¶ 23 (citations and quotation marks omitted).  Therefore, the legal question for this 
Court to resolve is this:  
Does a premises owner have a duty to take actions to prevent a 
person who never entered the premises from being exposed to 
dust generated on its property? 
This Court has identified several factors relevant to determining whether a 






“whether the defendant’s alleged tortious conduct consists of an affirmative act or merely 
an omission,” is the most critical.  Id. ¶ 6.  With the former (an affirmative act) a duty 
generally exists, and with the latter (omission) no duty exists.  Id. ¶ 7.  The second factor, 
“the legal relationship of the parties,” is a “plus” factor—used to impose a duty even when 
the act complained of is merely an omission.  Id. ¶ 9.  The final three factors, which consider 
foreseeability and policy, are “minus” factors—used to eliminate a duty that would 
otherwise exist.  Id. ¶ 21. 
 ConocoPhillips owed no duty to Mrs. Boynton because it neither engaged in an 
affirmative act nor has a relationship with her.  Even if ConocoPhillips had engaged in 
affirmative acts as to Mrs. Boynton, the remaining policy and foreseeability considerations 
would negate any duty.  The Court should therefore hold that the premises owner, 
ConocoPhillips, owed no duty to take actions to prevent a person who never entered the 
premises, Mrs. Boynton, from being exposed to dust in her home.  
I. CONOCOPHILLIPS HAS NO DUTY TO MRS. BOYNTON BECAUSE IT 
NEITHER ENGAGED IN ANY AFFIRMATIVE ACTS NOR HAS ANY 
RELATIONSHIP WITH HER 
a. Plaintiff’s Complaint is that ConocoPhillips Failed to Prevent Dust 
from Leaving the Premises 
Nearly every act taken by a person “carries with it a potential duty and resulting 
legal accountability for that act.”  Jeffs, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 9 (quoting Webb v. Univ. of Utah, 
2005 UT 80, ¶ 10, 125 P.3d 906, overruled on other grounds by Cope v. Utah Valley State 
Coll., 2014 UT 53, 342 P.3d 243).  Thus, in determining whether a duty exists, the question 






to the harm. Graves v. N. E. Serv., Inc., 2015 UT 28, ¶ 26, 345 P.3d 619.  If that were the 
case, a duty would exist in almost every case.  See Jeffs, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 9 (noting that “in 
almost every instance” affirmative acts carry some kind of duty).  Instead, the “threshold 
question” is what allegedly caused the harm: “(a) an affirmative act of the defendant or (b) 
an act of a third party that the defendant failed to prevent.”  Graves, 2015 UT 28, ¶ 20.  
This “long-recognized distinction between acts and omissions—or misfeasance and 
nonfeasance—makes a critical difference and is perhaps the most fundamental factor 
considered when evaluating a duty.” Jeffs, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 7.  Where the harm is allegedly 
caused by a defendant’s affirmative act, a duty of care typically attaches.  Id.  But, where 
the harm allegedly results from a defendant’s failure to protect someone from harm, no 
duty attaches absent a special relationship. Id. 
In this case, Plaintiff’s wife’s harm was, as Plaintiff puts it, caused when “Larry 
[Plaintiff] wore his dusty clothes home where Barbara [Plaintiff’s wife] washed them every 
week.  Before washing Larry’s clothes, Barbara would shake them out – exposing her to 
the asbestos dust that had settled onto them.  She breathed more asbestos dust when she 
swept the laundry room to clean up the asbestos dust.”  Br. of Appellee and Cross-
Appellant (Plaintiff), at 5 (internal citations to the record omitted); see also (R. 2684–7, 
2845, 3294–301, 4238, 4241–4, 5438–42.) Thus, the harm here resulted from Mrs. Boynton 
laundering her husband’s clothes. Plaintiff does not allege that ConocoPhillips or its 
employees engaged in any affirmative acts related to laundering Plaintiff’s clothes.   
Plaintiff’s complaint is, instead, that ConocoPhillips failed to prevent asbestos dust 






never monitored asbestos levels, never implemented any engineering controls to reduce his 
exposure, and never provide him with showers or laundry services to prevent the asbestos 
from leaving the oil refinery.” Br. of Appellee and Cross-Appellant (Plaintiff), at 7 
(internal citations to the record omitted) (emphasis added).  Because Plaintiff’s complaint 
is with what ConocoPhillips allegedly failed to do to protect Mrs. Boynton—rather than 
what it did to harm her—no duty attaches.   
To be sure, Plaintiff points to several “affirmative acts” allegedly done by 
ConocoPhillips’s employees, but none of these alleged acts caused the harm.  
“[A]ffirmative acts are a basis for imposing a duty in the performance of those acts, not for 
the broader duty to undertake additional measures aimed at preventing [the harm].”  
Graves, 2015 UT 28, ¶ 29 (emphasis in original).  Plaintiff claims that ConocoPhillips’s 
employees: (1) removed insulation and let it fall to the ground; and (2) swept up the debris.  
Br. of Appellee and Cross-Appellant (Plaintiff), at 1, 3, 6, 7.  See also (R. 02256–57.)   
These are affirmative acts.  But the crux of Plaintiff’s complaint is not that ConocoPhillips 
could have been more careful in removing insulation or sweeping up debris.  Nor is his 
complaint that Mrs. Boynton was injured by the removal or sweeping—that would be 
impossible because she never entered the premises.   Plaintiff’s complaint is that 
ConocoPhillips did not undertake additional measures aimed at preventing dust from 
leaving the premises and exposing Mrs. Boynton in her home.  
Recognizing the problem, Plaintiff goes against the undisputed facts and claims that 






(Plaintiff), at 27.1  To be clear, it is undisputed that Mrs. Boynton never entered 
ConocoPhillips’s premises.  It also undisputed that Mr. Boynton alone took home his dirty 
work clothes for his wife to wash.  At most, ConocoPhillips allegedly exposed Plaintiff to 
dust.  Id. at 7 (“ConocoPhillips’ employees generated asbestos dust that reached Larry…”) 
(emphasis added); Id. (“employees negligently removed and swept asbestos insulation 
debris while Larry worked less than twenty feet away.”) (emphasis added); Id. at 21 (“And 
they swept the residual insulation from the floor, generating asbestos dust that reached 
Larry, who worked within twenty feet of the insulation workers…”) (emphasis added).  
But Plaintiff has not alleged any fact supporting the conclusion that ConocoPhillips 
exposed Mrs. Boynton to dust.   
On this point, the Court’s decision in Graves is instructive.  In Graves, a child’s 
parent sued an employer after its employee sexually assaulted the child in the employer’s 
residential facility.  2015 UT 28, ¶¶ 3–9.  The plaintiff there pointed to several affirmative 
acts by the employer that were “plausibly connected to the assault.”  Id. ¶ 26.  These 
included leaving the door open for children, maintaining a portable swimming pool outside, 
offering candy and television to children, and hiring the culpable employee.  Id., at ¶¶ 26–
29.  This Court concluded, however, that the “core complaint” was not with what the 
employer did, but what it failed to do.  Plaintiffs’ claims were “aimed at [the employer’s] 
failures (as regarding training, supervision, and employment background checks), and not 
its affirmative acts.”  Id. ¶ 29.  In other words, the Court looked past plaintiffs’ 
                                              
1 Though Plaintiff makes this argument as to Kennecott, he claims that “ConocoPhillips engaged in the same 







characterizations of the allegedly wrongful conduct and, instead, focused on the real 
complaint: that the employer had failed to protect the child when it hired the employee.  
Even though the employer engaged in the affirmative act of hiring the culpable employee, 
the complaint was, in reality, based on the employer’s omissions. 
The same is true here.  Plaintiff’s complaint is not that ConocoPhillips’s employees 
should have exercised reasonable care when removing insulation or sweeping up debris.  
Plaintiff’s complaint is that ConocoPhillips failed to take additional measures to prevent 
dust from leaving its premises on Plaintiff’s clothes. See Hill v. Superior Prop. Mgmt. 
Servs., Inc., 2013 UT 60, ¶ 41, 321 P.3d 1054 (finding no duty because plaintiff’s “claim 
is that her injury could have been prevented if [defendant] had chosen to undertake 
additional activities.”). In other words, the type of harm suffered—inhalation of dust at 
home by someone that never entered the premises—“does not come within the range of 
harms that [ConocoPhillips, the premises owner] had a duty to avoid.”  Jeffs, 2012 UT 11, 
¶ 17 (discussing Joseph v. McCann, 2006 UT App 459, 147 P.3d 547).    Plaintiff, without 
citing any authority, urges the Court to find his act of taking dust to his home as entirely 
irrelevant.  This Court’s jurisprudence supports no such finding. Graves, 2015 UT 28, ¶ 20 
(“A person generally has ‘no duty to control the conduct of third persons.’”) (quoting 
Higgins v. Salt Lake Cnty., 855 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah 1993) (citing Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 315 (1965))). 
Because Plaintiff’s complaint is based on ConocoPhillips’s alleged omissions, no 






b. ConocoPhillips Has No Relationship—At All—With Mrs. Boynton 
Where, as here, plaintiff’s complaint centers on a defendant’s failures rather than 
actions, the law will only impose a duty when there is a “special relationship.”  Jeffs, 2012 
UT 11, ¶ 5 (“the legal-relationship factor is typically a ‘plus’ factor—used to impose a duty 
where one would otherwise not exist, such as where the act complained of is merely an 
omission.”). “The essence of the special relationship is dependence by one party upon the 
other or mutual dependence between the parties.”  Beach v. Univ. of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 
415–16 (Utah 1986) (citations omitted).  Examples include, “common carriers to its 
passenger, innkeeper and guest, landowner and invitees to his land, and one who take 
custody of another.”  Jeffs, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 8 (citations omitted).   Both in the lower court 
and on appeal, Plaintiff has conceded that there is no “special relationship” between 
ConocoPhillips and Mrs. Boynton that would give rise to a duty.  She never entered 
ConocoPhillips’s land and is, thus, not an invitee. Because Plaintiff’s complaint centers on 
what ConocoPhillips failed to do to protect a person with which it has no relationship, 
special or otherwise, no duty attaches.   
II. EVEN IF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT WAS WITH CONOCOPHILLIPS’S 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTS, THE REMAINING DUTY FACTORS WOULD 
NEGATE ANY DUTY 
The remaining duty factors aid the Court in determining whether to negate a duty 
that would otherwise exist.  Jeffs, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 21.  These “minus” factors include: (1) 
the foreseeability or likelihood of the injury; (2) public policy as to which party can best 






Because this case is premised on ConocoPhillips’s alleged omissions (rather than 
acts) to a person with which it has no relationship, there is no duty.  As such, the Court 
need not address the remaining “minus” duty factors.  ConocoPhillips addresses each of 
these factors only to show how they would negate a duty if one existed.   
a. It is Unforeseeable that a Person Who Never Enters a Premises May be 
Injured by a Substance Carried Off the Premises by An Invitee 
When evaluating whether to negate an otherwise existing duty, the foreseeability 
factor requires a court to consider “the general relationship between the alleged tortfeasor 
and the victim” to determine whether the type of harm alleged is foreseeable.  Jeffs, 2012 
UT 11, ¶ 25. The appropriate question is whether “a category of cases includes individual 
cases in which the likelihood of some type of harm is sufficiently high that a reasonable 
person could anticipate a general risk of injury to others.”  Id. ¶ 27.  The relevant category 
of cases here, then, consists of premises owners who allegedly fail to prevent invitees from 
carrying substances off the premises that harm others.  Id.  And the foreseeability question 
is whether there are circumstances within that category in which premises owners could 
reasonably foresee injury.  Id.2 
The relationship between ConocoPhillips and Mrs. Boynton is this: she is the wife 
of an employee of an independent contractor that ConocoPhillips hired to do work on its 
premises.  The reason that her harm is unforeseeable is the same reason that no duty exists 
                                              
2 Plaintiff’s suggestion that ConocoPhillips waived any argument on foreseeability is wrong.  ConocoPhillips argued 
to the lower court that foreseeability must analyze at a broad, categorical level—not by considering the specific 
mechanism of injury as argued by Plaintiff.  (R. 02245–46.)  ConocoPhillips also argued that the foreseeability 
“minus” factor was irrelevant because there is no duty in this case.  (R. 02243.)  ConocoPhillips expands on that 
argument on this appeal only to show the Court that it can “affirm a grant of summary judgment upon any grounds 






in the first place: premises owners do not control their invitees’ (including independent 
contractors and their employees) independent conduct.  Id. ¶ 15 (“a healthcare provider is 
not required to control its patients’ independent conduct.”).  Premises owners cannot 
control whether independent contractors properly train their employees on how to care for 
dirty work clothes, or whether the contractors provide shower and washing facilities to 
their employees.  Graves, 2015 UT 28, ¶ 20 (“A person generally has ‘no duty to control 
the conduct of third persons.’”) (quoting Higgins, 855 P.2d at 236 (citing Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 315 (1965))). And premises owners certainly cannot control whether 
invitees who work for those contractors ultimately carry substances off the premises and 
what they do thereafter.  Id.  Thus, any harm caused by an invitee exposing others to 
substances originating on the premises is not foreseeable to the premises owner.  But this 
is also why foreseeability is a “minus” factor: harm resulting from an omission is rarely 
foreseeable. 
Plaintiff does not dispute the law and agrees that foreseeability is “evaluated at a 
broad, categorical level” and that the analysis does not consider the “specific mechanism 
of injury.”  Br. of Appellee and Cross-Appellant (Plaintiff), at 29.  But Plaintiff then spends 
nearly seven pages discussing why the specific mechanism of alleged injury—inhalation 
of asbestos dust from someone’s clothes—was foreseeable to Defendants.  All of that is 
irrelevant and “conflates the kind of foreseeability relevant to the duty analysis with the 
foreseeability inquiries significant to matters of breach and proximate cause.”  Jeffs, 2012 
UT 11, ¶ 24.  Plaintiff’s foreseeability argument, whether in this specific case the particular 






additional precautions, is a question of breach, not duty.  Plaintiff’s argument misses the 
mark. 
Even so, it was not reasonably foreseeable to ConocoPhillips, a premises owner, 
that its independent contractor would not exercise reasonable care in instructing its 
employees how to care for dirty work clothes or how to avoid taking asbestos dust off the 
premises.  Graves, 2015 UT 28, ¶ 20.  Nor was it foreseeable that dirty work clothes could 
cause harm to whomever came in contact with Plaintiff’s clothes.  For example, Plaintiff 
claims that “[t]he pool of potential plaintiff for take-home asbestos exposure cases is small.  
Indeed, according the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, the number of deaths from 
mesothelioma in Utah during 2005, was fourteen.  And in 1999, homemakers accounted 
for a mere 6.8% of mesothelioma deaths in the United States.”  Br. of Appellee and Cross-
Appellant (Plaintiff), at 42 (internal citations to the record omitted).  Plaintiff’s argument 
that Mrs. Boynton’s harm is the “common result” of sweeping asbestos dust and removing 
insulation is, thus, unavailing. Br. of Appellee and Cross-Appellant (Plaintiff), at 24.   
Regardless of whether the danger of asbestos dust to people who are exposed to 
dirty clothes was or should have been known, a fact disputed by the parties, it was not 
reasonably foreseeable to ConocoPhillips that employees of its independent contractors 
would take home dusty work clothes and cause injury to others. 
No duty can exist in this case because ConocoPhillips neither engaged in any 
affirmative act as to Mrs. Boynton nor had any relationship with her.  For that same reason, 






b. ConocoPhillips Was Not in the Best Position to Prevent Mrs. Boynton 
from Inhaling Dust in Her Home  
The second factor Jeffs requires when determining whether to eliminate a duty that 
would otherwise exist, is whether someone other than defendant was in the best position to 
prevent the harm. 2012 UT 11, ¶ 30.  Where someone other than defendant has more control 
to avoid the harm, there may be no duty.  Id. This is particularly true when imposing a duty 
on the defendant would lead to an extraordinarily onerous and unworkable burden.  See In 
re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. of Appeals of Tex., 740 N.W.2d 206, 217 
(2007) (refusing to find that defendant owed a duty to every person with whom the clothes 
of the business’s employees and the employees of its independent contractors come into 
contact because it would “impose an extraordinarily onerous and unworkable burden.”). 
Here, Plaintiff and his employer were in a “superior position of control” to prevent 
Plaintiff’s wife from inhaling dust from his dirty work clothes in their home.  
ConocoPhillips had no control over what Plaintiff did with his work clothes, nor how, 
where, or who launder them.  Graves, 2015 UT 28, ¶ 20.  This is particularly true, as the 
district court recognized, because Plaintiff was not employed by ConocoPhillips.  (R. 
05444.)  He worked for L.E. Myers Electric when he came onto the premises.  It is 
undisputed that ConocoPhillips did not supervise, train, or otherwise instruct Mr. Boynton 
in his work—much less how and where to clean his clothes after work.  (R. 05444–46.) 
(“In short, these Defendants had no involvement whatsoever with the injury causing aspect 
of the work—the presence of Mr. Boynton near insulation works that allegedly exposed 






ha[d] to avoid injury by taking reasonable precautions.” Jeffs, 2012 UT 11, ¶ 30. Rather, 
Plaintiff and his employer were “best situated to take reasonable precautions to avoid the 
injury.”  Id. In nearly identical cases, courts outside of Utah have agreed with this 
conclusion.  See, e.g. In re NYC Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115 (N.Y. 2005) (finding that 
an employer “was, in fact, entirely dependent upon [the employee’s] willingness to comply 
with and carry out such risk-reduction measures.”). 
Thus, even if ConocoPhillips did some affirmative act (it did not) and owed a duty 
to Mrs. Boynton, the fact that Plaintiff was better situated to prevent Mrs. Boynton from 
washing his clothes would weigh against imposing a duty. 
c. Imposing a Duty on Premises Owners for Substances Carried Off 
Their Premises by Invitees Creates Almost Infinite Liability 
Courts across the country have refused to impose a duty in take-home asbestos cases 
because “liability for take-home exposure would essentially be infinite” because the duty 
would necessarily be extended to “children, babysitters, neighbors, dry cleaners, or any 
other person who potentially came in contact with [the person’s] clothes.”  Gillen v. Boeing 
Co., 40 F. Supp. 3d 534 (E.D. Pa. 2014); see also Quiroz v. ALOCA Inc., 243 Ariz. 560, 
567–68, 416 P.3d 824, 831–32 (2018) (no duty under Arizona law); CSX Transp., Inc. v. 
Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208 (2005) (no duty under Georgia law); Nelson v. Aurora Equip. 
Co., 909 N.E.2d 931, 939 (2009) (no duty under Illinois law); Van Fossen v. MidAmerican 
Energy Co., 777 N.W.2d 689, 697 (Iowa 2009) (no duty under Iowa law); Adams v. Ownes-
Illinois, Inc., 119 Md.App. 395, 705 A.2d 58, 66 (1998) (no duty under Maryland law); In 






218 (2007) (no duty under Michigan law); In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 
115, 116 (2005) (no duty under New York law); Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,929 
N.E.2d 448, 451 (2010) (no duty under Ohio law).   
Still, Plaintiff argues that the foreseeability requirement would limit how far the 
duty could extend.  Yet in the same breath, he says that harm to the wife of an employee 
of an independent contractor that was hired to do work on ConocoPhillips’s premises was 
foreseeable.  No doubt that if the Court finds a duty in this case, there would be “no 
principled basis in the law upon which to distinguish the claim of a spouse” with any other 
person that might have come in contact with someone’s clothes.  Riedel v. ICI Am. Inc., 
968 A.2d 17 (Del. 2009). Such a ruling would open the flood gates in a crisis that is already 
“one of the most costly…ever within our nation’s legal system.”  Fourteenth Dist. Ct., 740 
N.W.2d at 217.   And that is just take-home asbestos cases. 
Finding a duty in this case would also vastly expand Utah tort law in that it would 
require premises owners to prevent invitees from carrying potentially-harmful substances 
off the premises and exposing others—regardless of whether the premises owner had any 
control over the invitee.  Thus, Plaintiff’s claim that the “pool of potential plaintiffs for 
take-home asbestos exposure cases is small” should be given little weight.  This Court has, 
on multiple occasions, held that the question whether a duty exists should be determine 
with “categorical, bright-line rules of law applicable to a general class of cases.”  Jeffs, 
2012 UT 11, ¶ 23.  The imposition of a duty here would, therefore, expand the duties of 
premises owners and impose liability when they merely fail to act.  Public policy weighs 







The lower court correctly concluded that ConocoPhillips owed no duty of care to 
Mrs. Boynton.  She never entered ConocoPhillips’s premises and was never employed by 
ConocoPhillips. Nor was her husband. Though Mr. Boynton worked for an independent 
contractor of ConocoPhillips, he was—at most—an invitee on ConocoPhillips’s premises.  
As such, ConocoPhillips engaged in no affirmative acts as to Mrs. Boynton.  Plaintiff’s 
complaint is, instead, that ConocoPhillips failed to prevent him from carrying dust off the 
property.  The tenuous relationship between Mr. Boynton and ConocoPhillips cannot 
support imposing a duty on ConocoPhillips to protect his wife.  Wherefore, this Court 
should affirm the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of ConocoPhillips.   
DATED this 31stday of January, 2020.  
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